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THE EXTRAORDINARY MAJORITY RULE
IN MUNICIPAL BONDING:
WESTBROOK v. MIHALY1
At a special election in November, 1969, the voters of San Francisco
gave greater than a simple majority to two propositions.2 These propo-
sitions sought authorization to incur local general bonded indebtedness
of $9,998,000 for park and recreation improvements and $5,000,000 for
new school construction and modernization of older facilities. 3 Although sim-
ple majorities were received by both propositions, neither received the two-
thirds majority required by the California Constitution4 and thus were not
certified as approved.5 The petitioners, all of whom were affirmative vot-
ers,6 demanded that the respondent, the San Francisco Registrar of Voters,
certify the propositions as approved and commence offering the bonds for
sale. When the registrar refused, the petitioners instituted suit to have the
California constitutional provision declared violative of the federal consti-
1 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970), petitions for cert. filed, 39
U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Sept. 2, 1970) (No. 641) and 39 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Sept. 21,
1970) (No. 730). The opinion is by the court. Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Peters,
concurred in part and dissented in part.
2 Proposition "A" received 56.8% affirmative majority vote and Proposition "B"
received 52.3%. Id. at 772 n.3, 471 P.2d at 491 n.3, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 843 n.3.
3 School construction and modernization was primarily for the Hunters Point area of
San Francisco, which is largely a minority area. Id. at 772, 471 P.2d at 491, 87 Cal.
Rptr. at 843.
4 The court considered former CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 18, now renumbered CAL.
CONsT. art. XIII, § 40 (1970), which provides:
No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, shall incur
any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any
year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-
thirds of the qualified electors thereof, voting at an election to be held for that
purpose, nor unless before or at the time of incurring such indebtedness provision
shall be made for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on
such indebtedness as it falls due, and also provision to constitute a sinking fund for
the payment of the principal thereof, on or before maturity, which shall not ex-
ceed forty years from the time of contracting the same ...
5 CAL. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 21754 (West 1969) provides that the school district gov-
erning board shall certify the results to the board of supervisors if it appears from the
certification of election results that two-thirds of the votes cast favored issuance of the
bonds.
CAL. GovT. CODE ANN. § 29910 (West 1968) provides that the county board may
adopt a resolution providing for bond issuance if the bonds are authorized at an elec-
tion. This implies a clerk/registrar certifying the results of the election in order to be
authorized.
CAL. GovT. CODE ANN. § 43614 (West 1966) provides for city bond issuance if
two-thirds of the electors vote affirmatively. This, too, implies that an election official
must certify the results in order to validate the findings.
6 2 Cal. 3d at 772-73, 471 P.2d at 491, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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tutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. 7 They further sought
a peremptory writ to command the registrar to certify the propositions as
approved and to offer the bonds for sale.8
The California Supreme Court exercised original jurisdiction and found
that this particular extraordinary majority provision discriminatorily classi-
fied the petitioners, and thus denied them equal protection of the laws
by giving their votes less value than those of negative voters. The court
declined, however, to grant affirmative relief by peremptory writ of mandate,
thus giving solely prospective effect to its decision.' 0
The first issue faced by the court was whether or not the two-thirds require-
ment classified the petitioners at all. The state argued that no citizens were
classified in any manner whatsoever, because no one was objectively iden-
tifiable by the California constitutional provision." Prior to the election
one could not distinguish any separate class of persons to be treated dif-
ferently from any other. However, even though the classification was not
based upon generally impermissible characteristics such as race, 12 indigence,' 3
occupation, 14 political party association, 15 religion, 16 or property owner-
ship,'1 the voters were nonetheless classified by the manner in which they
voted (either "Yes" or "No" on the particular issue).18
The United States Supreme Court has declared that mere classification does
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states in part: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
8 2 Cal. 3d at 773, 471 P.2d at 491-92, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
9 Id. at 773, 471 P.2d at 491, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 843. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10
provides in part: "The Supreme Court . . . [has] original jurisdiction in proceedings
for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition."
10 2 Cal. 3d at 800-01, 471 P.2d at 512-13, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65. Justices Mosk
and Peters dissented as to this issue and would have granted the writ.
11 Id. at 782, 471 P.2d at 498, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
12 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
13 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
15 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
16 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
18 The court concluded:
It appears obvious to us that section 18 implicitly creates two classes of voters:
those who favor a proposed bond issue and those who oppose it. It is not essential
that a classification appear in explicit terms on the face of the law. Nor is it neces-
sary that those who are allegedly disadvantaged by the classification either consti-
tute a class which is 'objectively identifiable' prior to the election or that they share
in common other characteristics, such as race, economic status or residence. It is
sufficient that the class emerge from its inchoate state at the time of the election
and that it be defined by the act of voting affirmatively on a bond issue proposition.
The equal protection clause extends to the shared political interests of groups other-
wise random and diverse.
2 Cal. 3d at 782, 471 P.2d at 498, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
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not of itself deprive a group of equal protection.1 9 Only those classfications
which in fact discriminate need be examined. Therefore, the California
Supreme Court reached the second issue: Since there was a classification,
was it discriminatory? The state argued that regardless of which way per-
sons intended to vote on any particular issue, no one was disenfranchised
and all votes were fully counted. However, in the Westbrook situation,
there are definite adverse consequences to those who are in favor of a propo-
sition. The two-thirds requirement in fact diminishes the power of the
"Yes" voters because their number need be twice as great as that of the "No"
voters in order to prevail. Thus, the "No" voters are a favored class, based
solely upon the way in which they cast their ballots. This is a case of the state
constitution discriminating against the "Yes" classification of voters.
20
A similar situation was found in Rimarcik v. Johansen.2 1  A United
States district court considered the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute
requiring a 55% favorable vote for adoption of a home rule charter.22 The
court found that the voting percentage requirement unfairly classified vot-
ers because
[tihe efficacy of the 'Yes' vote is effectively diminished by the 55% voter approval
requirement. The basis for the discrimination is that the statute, in granting the
franchise in the manner it does, ascribes a value to the vote according to the voter's
preference on the issue to be decided in the election.
23
In Williams v. Rhodes,24 an Ohio elections statute required established
political parties to file voter signatures equal to only 10% of the total number
of ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election in order to secure a position
on the ballot, whereas new parties needed 15%. The United States Supreme
Court held that the statute violated the equal protection clause because it
classified citizens either on the basis of political party association or by the
candidate which they wanted to support. Although that case dealt with an
election of a governmental representative, the classification itself was very
similar to that in the Westbrook case. In Westbrook, "No" voters needed
only 33-1/3% of the total votes cast to prevail on the bond issue whereas
"Yes" voters needed 66-2/3%. Thus, the affirmative voters in Westbrook
and the new political party voters in Williams were required to manifest a
greater voting percentage than the other classifications.
The California Supreme Court found that there was a classification of
voters by the two-thirds requirement and that the classification discriminated
against the "Yes" voters by favoring the "No" voters. It was thus faced with
39 Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
20 2 Cal. 3d at 782-83, 471 P.2d at 499, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
21 310 F. Supp. 61 (D. Minn. 1970).
22 A home rule charter is a document issued by the state which outlines the condi-
tions under which a city or other unincorporated body may organize to establish self-
government over its own local matters.
23 310 F. Supp. 61, 68 (D. Minn. 1970).
24 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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its third issue: Which test was applicable to determine whether or not the
the discriminatory classification violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Two tests have been used by the United States Supreme Court
to evaluate discriminatory classifications for compliance with the Constitu-
tional requirement of equal protection under the law. These alternatives
are the traditional "rational relationship" test 25 and the more recent "com-
pelling state interest" test.
26
The traditional test generally holds that a state statute will be set aside
only if it bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state end. The Su-
preme Court applied this test in McGowan v. Maryland,27 where the stat-
ute in question was a "Sunday Closing Law" which the Court found was
rationally related to the state's objective of providing for the health of its
populace and enhancing the recreational atmosphere of the day. The Court
there stated that the Fourteenth Amendment
permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard [of equal
protection] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective.28
In Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,29 apprenticeship re-
quirements for river pilot licenses were upheld because the statutory discrimi-
nation did bear some rational relation to the regulated activites.8 0 The
traditional rule might be interpreted to mean that states are benefited by a pre-
sumption of constitutionality. Justice Black has proclaimed that state stat-
utes do "not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as these distinc-
tions and discriminations are not 'irrational', 'irrelevant', 'unreasonable',
'arbitrary', or 'invidious'."31
The "compelling state interest" test has been applied to two factual cate-
gories: suspect classification (such as racial criteria) and fundamental inter-
ests (such as voting rights). 32  The "suspect classification" category deals
with classifications which by their nature are arbitrary and invidious. In
an early leading case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,3 3 the application of a building and
25 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 564 (1947).
26 McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
27 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
28 Id. at 425.
29 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
30 Id. at 564. Both McGowan and Kotch dealt with purely regulatory laws.
31 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673-74 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
32 Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839,
852.
33 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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occupation code to exclude Chinese was invalidated because it was discrimi-
natorily based upon national origin. And, although decided by other criteria,
McDonald v. Board of Elections Commissioners34 designated wealth and
race as two factors which independently rendered a classification highly
suspect and therefore demanded a much more exacting standard of judicial
review than the traditional test.33
The "fundamental interests" situation has often swallowed up "suspect
classification" because so many cases of discriminatory classification involve
restrictions placed upon the fundamental freedoms 36 guaranteed by the Uni-
ted States Constitution.
37
Although the phrase "compelling state interest" was used in the 1963
case of Sherbert v. Verner,3 8 it was not designated as a guideline until
1969, in Shapiro v. Thompson.39 Nevertheless, its principles had been pre-
viously formulated, discussed and applied for many years, with special atten-
tion being devoted to them by the Supreme Court during the reapportionment
period.40 In Reynolds v. Sims,41 the Court dealt with the malapportionment
of the Alabama legislature and stated that when a state denied the franchise,
careful and meticulous scrutiny was required to determine if it was necessary
to further a valid state interest.42 In Carrington v. Rash,43 the Court
again dealt with the right to vote and determined that conclusive residency
presumptions made for "some remote administrative benefit to the State"44
were not sufficiently compelling to restrict the franchise. In Kramer v. Union
Free School District,45 the reason for the close and exacting examination
of state statutes was given: the right to vote in a free and unimpaired man-
ner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights. In Kramer, Chief
Justice Warren stated
s4 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
s5 Id. at 807.
86 Fundamental freedoms is a somewhat vague term, but includes at least the first
amendment freedom of religion as demonstrated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); the right to vote as demonstrated by the reapportionment cases, Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); See also Kramer v. Union
Free School-Dist, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965);
perhaps even the right to inter-state travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
but see the strong dissent by Justice Harlan, id. at 659.
37 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 39 (1968) where the issue of in-
vidious discrimination becomes intertwined with the fundamental right to vote. See also
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
38 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
39 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
40 This period began with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
41 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
42 Id. at 562.
43 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
44 Id. at 96.
45 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs
which substantially affect their lives. 46
This test raises the question, is the statutory classification necessary to
promote a valid and compelling state interest? The Kramer case demon-
strates the division of the test into its two separate components: 1) whether
the discrimination is necessary to promote the state interest, and 2)
whether the state interest is compelling.47 It is this two part distinction
that demonstrates the relationship between the traditional test and the com-
pelling state interest test. Both tests ask if the classification is rational and
relevant, but the compelling state interest test goes far beyond and inquires
if the classification is necessary to implement the state purpose. It also re-
quires that the state interest be a most powerful and compelling one. The
first component, the necessity requirement, involves the search for a less ob-
jectionable method by which the state's purpose may be achieved. As stated
in Sherbert v. Verner,48 it is "incumbent upon [the state] to demonstrate that
no alternative forms of regulation would [achieve the intended state interest]
without infringing [constitutional] rights."149  The Kramer case illustrates
the necessary tailoring and the exacting standard of precision which is re-
quired when dealing with the franchise.50 A New York statute limited the
franchise in certain school district to owners or lessees of taxable realty plus
parents or guardians of children in public schools. This was intended to
limit the franchise to persons primarily interested in the elections. The
Court considered the contention that this statute excluded persons honestly in-
terested in educational standards and programs and who were intimately affec-
ted by school board decisions as reflected in the price of goods and services in
the community51 and thus was not sufficiently tailored to comply with the
necessity requirement. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,2 a poll tax
requirement was invalidated with the Court emphasizing that "where funda-
mental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scruti-
nized and carefully confined." 53 Here, the tailoring of the statute was much
too broad because the tax requirement was not at all germane to the voter's
ability to participate intelligently in the election process.
Often times, the difficulty in applying the equal protection clause standards
46 Id. at 626-27 (footnote omitted).
47 Id. at 632 n.14.
48 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
49 Id. at 407.
50 395 U.S. 621, 639 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 630. The level of property taxes affects non-property owners because the
rise in property taxes causes businesses to charge more for their products and residents
to demand more for their services in order to offset the tax increase.
52 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
53 Id. at 670.
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(traditional versus compelling state interest) does not stem from the differ-
ences of opinion as to what the specific tests are.5 4 Instead, the difficulty
arises when determining which test fits a particular fact situation.
On the one hand there is the narrow interpretation proposed by the state in-
terests in Westbrook. This viewpoint contends that the fundamental rights test
applies only if the right to vote is completely denied and if the denial is based
upon objectively indentifiable characteristics such as race, creed, economic
status, or geographical location. 55 The state argued that the right to vote was
not involved at all in Westbrook because voting on a bond issue is only a
procedural step in an administrative process55 to authorize a particular form
of indebtedness, whereas voting rights only apply to elections of public of-
ficials.
On the other hand, the petitioning voter relied upon a broad interpretation.
This viewpoint contends that it is the right to vote itself that is sacred, and
emphasizes that this right is to be protected regardless of the manner in
which the vote is affected, either by dilution or denial. The petitioner ar-
gued that he did not claim the right to vote on all issues of governmental ex-
penditures, but that when the electorate is given that privilege, it must be
in accord with the equal protection clause. He further argued that a dilution
causes as much injury as an outright denial because the dilution denies the
voter an effective voice in governmental affairs which substantially affect his
life. 57
These two opposing viewpoints may best be summarized by labeling them
the "Bogert" view for the state and the "Lance" view for the petitioner.
In Bogert v. Kinzer,58 the qualified but unsuccessful electors in a munic-
ipal bond election contended that the Idaho constitutional provision5 9
which required a two-thirds majority vote for issuance of general obligation
bonds by subdivisions of the state government was unconstitutional as viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The
54 But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659-62 (1969) (dissenting opinion)
where Justice Harlan argued against the use of the compelling state interest test when
dealing with fundamental rights. However, Justice Harlan was arguing to affirm state
restrictions on welfare because food, welfare, and other necessities of life were not fun-
damental rights as he saw them (e.g., rights specifically guaranteed in the Constitution).
In Westbrook, however, the right to vote is clearly a fundamental right. Justice Harlan
would argue that the overextension of the fundamental rights category should be cured
by eliminating it and handling such deprivations under the due process clause instead.
55 In Westbrook, the identifiable characteristic was the "Yes"-"No" classification.
2 Cal. 3d at 782-83, 471 P.2d at 498-99, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51.
56 Id. at 785-86, 471 P.2d at 501, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
57 Id. at 773, 783-84, 471 P.2d at 491, 499-500, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 843, 851-52. But
see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
58 465 P.2d 639 (Idaho 1970).
59 IDAHO CONsT. art. 8, § 3 states that no subdivision of the state may incur any
indebtedness exceeding the income and revenue provided for that year without the
assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors at a special election. 465 P.2d at 640.
19711
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Idaho Supreme Court opinion reviewed the cases from Baker v. Carr0 to
Cipriano v. City of Houma.61 The court analyzed these cases by reference
to two primary inquiries: First, was the case involved with a denial or a mere
dilution of the vote, and second, was it an election of a governmental rep-
resentative or merely a referendum. After a lengthly analysis, the court
concluded that voters for representatives may not have their right to vote de-
nied nor the value of their vote diluted because of geographical location,
but that voters in other decisional processes, such as general obligation bond
and revenue bond elections, are protected only from the denial of the right to
vote, and then only if that denial is without a rational basis.6 2  Several
commentators have followed this same line of reasoning, and argued that
the compelling state interest test does not apply to decisional elections (as
opposed to elections of governmental representatives) where there is a mere
dilution of voting power.
63
The "Lance" viewpoint is illustrated in the case of Lance v. Board of Ed-
ucation.6 4 In that case, the West Virginia constitution65 required a three-
fifths (60%) majority to pass general obligation bonds when the cost would
exceed the income and revenues of the year for the municipality. When
challenged, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that the state constitutional
provision was violative of the equal protection clause of the federal Consti-
tution. In analyzing the apportionment cases stressing "one man, one
vote", the court noted that most of the cases involved elections of legislative
representatives. But the court went behind these surface distinctions to the
theory underlying the decisions. The court seemed most concerned with
the citizen's interest in maintaining the effectiveness of his vote. It was em-
phasized in Gray v. Sanders6 that:
[I]f a State in a statewide election weighted the male vote more heavily than
the female vote or the white vote more heavily than the Negro vote, none could
successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable. How then can one
person be given twice or ten times the voting power of another person in a state-
wide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the
smallest rural county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to
be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal
vote. .... 67
Although concerned with the type of election, the Court concentrated on the
value of one person's vote in relation to that of another. Heavy reliance
60 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
61 395 U.s. 701 (1969).
62 465 P.2d at 645.
63 See, e.g., Note, 7 Housr. L. REv. 500 (1970); Note, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rlv.
553 (1970).
64 170 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1020 (1970).
65 W. VA. CONsr. art. X, § 8; 170 S.E.2d at 784.
66 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
67 Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 4
NOTES
was placed upon Cipriano v. City of Houma,68 a class action to enjoin
the city from issuing utility revenue bonds voted on by only property
taxpayers. The United States Supreme Court extended the "one man, one
vote" rule to elections involving municipal bonds, and applied the compelling
state interest test for the first time to this class of case. Although that case
dealt with a complete denial of the right to vote, the right to vote was
heavily emphasized, not the type of election. In Lance, the West Virginia
Supreme Court stated that
if the weight and force of a person's vote can be debased and diluted in accordance
with [a strict interpretation, there is] no escape from the conclusion that the weight
and force of such a vote may legally be debased and diluted virtually to the point
of total extinction.69
The "Bogert" view advances two primary reasons in support of its theory.
First, a strict application of stare decisis dictated that the rationale for find-
ing a violation of equal protection did not extend to dilution of voting
strength in a municipal bond referendum.70  The court developed for itself
a theory which is almost inflexible. Since no prior case had dealt with the
question whether municipal bond elections involved dilution of voting
strength, then the Bogert court would not decide that such elections did
involve a dilution in voting strength. The problem with this view is that
a tedious analysis of past case holdings does not cast any light on new
situations and circumstances. The law grows and functions only by being
able to adapt to new situations. For example, in City of Phoenix v. Kolod-
ziejski7 l the Supreme Court of the United States expanded their holding in
Cipriano to include municipal general obligation bonds as well as revenue and
utility bonds. The Bogert court could have applied this type of analysis. It
chose not to.72 If the rules were never applied to situations slightly different
from those previously decided, a vast array of grievances would be left
unconsidered because of the rigidity of the legal system.
The second Bogert argument is based upon the belief that "majoritarian-
ism" is a governmental theory unfit for judicial review7a Furthermore, many
federal constitutional provisions demonstrate that the United States is not
completely committed to the rule of the simple majority. 74 This denial of
judicial review would leave the question to the legislature.
Regardless of legislative review, there are many constitutional guarantees
which require judicial interpretation in order to adequately safeguard individ-
ual rights from state action. A state cannot completely dispense with jury
trials in criminal matters because it is a right guaranteed by the federal Con-
68 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
69 170 S.E.2d at 791.
70 465 P.2d at 645.
71 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
72 465 P.2d at 645.
73 Id. at 648.
74 Id., quoting Misreading Democracy, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 1969, at 10.
1971]
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stitution,7 5 which is the supreme law of the land.70  The state cannot re-
duce the jury in size to one man (who might also function as judge) because
this would dilute the right to a jury trial to the point of virtual extinction.77
Similarly, unless voting percentage requirements can be judicially examined,
what would prevent the state from requiring 75% majorities, then 90%, then
even 100% to effect certain actions? Many federal provisions which re-
quire extraordinary majority votes were compromises provided in order to
establish a nation of many states. 78 Since the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land, it is not necessary that all of its procedural guarantees con-
form to the other general standards it sets forth. Furthermore, treaty ratifi-
cations, impeachment proceedings, even the electoral college perhaps would
meet the test of a compelling "United States" interest themselves.
One of the strongest analytical arguments has recently been made by Su-
san J. Selvern. 79  Miss Selvem contended that the extension of "one man,
one vote" to tax and bond referenda is unwarranted because it involves a
two-step process. The first step is where the people vote directly for their
representatives, and here the "one man, one vote" standard is applicable in
order to preserve the equal representation of all citizens and to retain citizen
faith in the governmental process. However, Miss Selvem contended that
voting in a bond referendum is much more akin to the "second step" in the
legislative process. The second step is where the representative votes on
issues within the legislative body itself. At this step the "house rules" come
into play and may require more than a simple majority for passage
of certain issues and bills. Since this is an organizational and political
question the courts will not and should not intervene. What Miss Selvern
implied was that in decisional processes other than direct elections of govern-
mental representatives, the voters are really acting in the capacity of a "su-
per-legislature", and thus the equal protection clause should not apply. In
this instance, since the matter need not be submitted to the voters at all,
equal protection standards should give way to the legislature's own house
75 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... "
70 U.S. CONST. art. VI provides in part: 'This Constitution ... shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any-
thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding ..
77 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
78 See M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966)
[hereinafter cited FARRANDI] and S. PADOvER, To SEcuRE THESE BLESSINGS (1962)
[hereinafter cited PADovRI:
(1) % vote for expulsion: 2 FARRAND at 254; PADOVER at 262.
(2) % vote for treaty ratification: 2 FARAuN at 544, 547-48; PADoVER, at 321.
(3) 2k vote to override veto: 2 FARRANI at 585-87; PADOVER at 382.
(4) % vote for impeachment: 1 FARRAND at 85-87; Padover at 390.
(5) Constitutional amendments: 1 FARRAND at 202-03, 206, 478; PADOVER at
423-24.
79 Note, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 553 (1970).
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rules.80 In Bogert, the rules of the super-legislature are contained in the
Idaho constitution, and these rules require a two-thirds majority vote in order
to authorize certain types of indebtedness.
This analogy to legislative rules is superficially strong. The effect of this
analytical "two-step" process is to take us one step further away from
individual acts and rights guaranteed by the Constitution and one step
closer to the "political thicket". 81 The judicial function is not to analyze,
approve and ratify "house rules" of the legislature; it is instead to provide a
forum for individual citizens to obtain redress of their grievances. As stated
in Kramer v. Union Free School District:
82
States do have a latitude in determining whether . . . various questions shall be
submitted to the voters .... However, "once the franchise is granted to the
electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 83
When Miss Selvem assumed a state where "all citizens are considered repre-
sentatives", she assumed away the problem at hand. If every citizen can
be equated with the government itself, then governmental discriminatory clas-
sification of citizens and inequalities of voting power become impossible,
because no longer are there any "citizens" to classify.8 4
The "Lance" view presents four primary reasons to support its theory that
it is the vote that is all-important and not the manner of impairment.
First, the court recognized that the United States Constitution is supreme in
relation to the West Virginia constitution.8 Second, the Cipriano decision
that the equal protection clause applies to utility revenue bond elections (and
not just elections of public officials) greatly assists the case for general obliga-
tion bonds, since the difference between general obligation bonds and utility
revenue bonds is slight. In Cipriano, the Court placed heavy reliance upon
80 In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 215-18 (1970), the dissent sug-
gested a similar theory whereby the first step is the same, the election of representatives
by a simple majority, and the second step is the legislative decision to submit general
obligation bond questions to a vote by property taxpayers, where the burden supposedly
"legally" falls. The dissent argues that if the representatives could take the action on
their own initiative, without violating the equal protection clause, why does seeking a
referendum change matters?
81 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
82 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
83 Id. at 629, quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
84 Miss Selvern's opinion impliedly takes the view that the people, in establishing a
constitution and in forming a government, give all governing powers to the state, and
if anything is given back, it is by the grace of the state and with any restrictions the state
wishes to place on it. This argument is answered by the "retention of rights" theory
which holds that the voters retain all powers not completely exercised by the state. Thus
the citizens retain the rights and powers on an equal basis with all other citizens.
85 U.S. CONsT. art. VI provides in part: "This Constitution. .. shall be the supreme
Law of the Land. .. ."
W. VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 1 states in part: "The Constitution of the United States of
America. . . shall be the supreme law of the land."; 170 S.E.2d at 786.
19711
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the fact that the exclusion of non-property owners excepted "substantially
affected and directly interested" 86 voters. In Lance, voters who were not
property owners were also affected and interested. If only property taxes
increased (and no others) because of the passage of the bond issues, all
citizens would still be affected because of the rise in cost of services and hous-
ing. This is probable because those property owners directly affected by
property tax increases were likely to pass on such tax increases by in-
creasing prices where those property owners were also proprietors of local
businesses. Thus the substantial effect and direct interest rationale ap-
plies equally to utility revenue and general obligation bonds. Third, since
the state constitution granted the right to vote on these issues, the equal
protection clause of the federal Constitution immediately attached to pro-
tect the citizen's exercise of this right. This argument received great
support from Kramer.8 7 Fourth, dilution of voting strength can be easily
made complete denial by simply increasing the percentage require-
ment until a 100% vote is necessary to prevail. If a vote may be diluted by
a 60% requirement, why not a 90% or 100% as well?
The Lance viewpoint is more persuasive since it recognizes the crucial
fact that voting on bond referenda is a fundamental right because of the act
of voting. Lance recognized that denial of the vote and dilution of voting
strength are not opposites. Whereas the Bogert court looked at denial and
dilution as totally distinct and unrelated concepts justifying the application
of different tests to each, the Lance court, in effect, looked upon the con-
cept of voting as a continuum: at one end there is the unrestrained power
to vote completely on par with other citizens; in the middle area is the di-
luted vote; at the other end is the totally denied vote. It is a differentiation
of degree, not of kind. As stated in Reynolds v. Sims, 88
the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise.8 9
Lance realistically looked at the whole concept of voting-that is, each
voter making his decision, marking his ballot, and having his ballot given
equal weight with that of his fellow voters. The Bogert court, in contrast,
concentrated on the form of the voting, not on the substance. If a vote is not
weighted equally, then confidence in the election process is undermined.
Thus, Lance found that the concept of voting is the key to the decision and
recognized the franchise as a fundamental right not to be divested or diluted
unless a compelling state interest so requires.
After determining that the compelling state interest test was the applicable
standard to evaluate the discriminatory classification in Westbrook, the Cali-
86 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
87 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969).
88 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
89 Id. at 555.
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fornia Supreme Court inquired whether or not the state had such an inter-
est to justify the two-thirds requirement for passage of local general obli-
gation bonds.
The state argued in Westbrook that the two-thirds requirement was neces-
sary to prevent the creation of improvident debt.90 It feared that malev-
olent popular majorities would approve projects beyond their ability to
pay and thus cause financial irresponsibility and municipal ruin. The court
answered that this possibility was extremely remote because of a corps of pro-
fessional administrators, strict procedures for reporting and auditing bond
transactions, and the presence of a constitutional provision requiring the col-
lection of interest yearly plus a sinking fund for repayment of principal. 91
Furthermore, California state general obligation bonds require only a simple
majority for approval and no improvident borrowing or even lower ratings
have resulted.
92
The state also contended that the restriction was aimed at developing a
strong popular and informed public sentiment regarding the wisdom and fi-
nancial ability of the community to absorb the costs -of the bonds.93 How-
ever, no proof was offered to show that a two-thirds requirement automati-
cally fulfills this requirement. The fact that there is a compulsory referen-
dum alone probably stimulates a more enlightened citizenry.94
The state further argued that the two-thirds extraordinary majority re-
quirement "placed [inherent] obstacles in the path of improvident borrow-
ing."95  However, this same requirement places obstacles in the path of
prudent and long-range borrowing for needed future contingencies. The
state also argued that a majority of those voting on any particular bond prop-
osition rarely equals a majority of the total number of qualified electors. By
this reasoning, the state accepts the simple majority theory in principle.
However, the two-thirds requirement itself does not guarantee that a major-
ity of the qualified electors will vote. All that the extraordinary majority
requirement does is to assist the "No" voters at the expense of the "Yes"
voters. In essence, no arguments were advanced which demonstrate that
the two-thirds requirement is a necessary restriction to promote a com-
pelling and necessary state interest. It is granted that the status of municipal
90 Brief for Respondent at 16 [on Issue of Compelling State Interest], Westbrook v.
Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970).
91 2 Cal. 3d at 789-90, 471 P.2d at 503-04, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55, quoting CAL.
CONST. art. XI, § 18.
92 Id. at 790-91, 471 P.2d at 505, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
93 Id. at 792, 471 P.2d at 506, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
04 Id. at 795, 471 P.2d at 508-09, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61. See Brief for Respondent,
supra note 90, at 9, quoting CAL. CONsT. REVISION COmm'N, BACKGROUND STUDY 3, at
19-20 (1969) where the reason for a two-thirds majority is declared to promote local
citizen interest and control over their government.
95 Brief for Respondent, supra note 90, at 9, quoting CAL. CONST. REVIsION COMM'N,
BACKGROUND STUDY 3, at 19-20 (1969).
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finances is a valid interest of the state, but the restrictions upon the franchise
in the discriminatory manner employed (the two-thirds requirement) are not
necessary to, nor do they serve, any such interest.
The state expressed the fear that if this decision were followed to its
logical conclusion, then simple majority approval of all governmental action
(both state and federal) would be required. This is not necessarily true.
Many statutes and provisions requiring extraordinary majorities may still
pass the compelling state interest test. For example, impeachment proceed-
ings might still be permitted to retain extraordinary majority requirements
to preserve the stability and constant operation of government necessary for
effective administration.9" In State ex. rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Board97
the New Mexico requirement for a 75% majority for constitutional amend.
ment was impliedly upheld. In a different respect, federal requirements
of extraordinary majorities were often based upon compromises neces-
sary to establish the federal government and are stated within the Constitu-
tion itself. Many involve the "checks and balances" between branches of
government (for example, two-thirds vote to override a presidential98 or gu-
bernatorial99 veto) which do not effect a dilution of the individual's voting
power.
The last issue handled by the Supreme Court of California was the ques-
tion of affirmative relief. The court held that considerations of fairness and
public policy compelled a limitation of the effect of this decision to pros-
pective matters only. It stated that any other ruling would logically com-
mit the court to validate all past bond issues which received simple major-
ity approval.100 This is not logically true, because the court might have
restricted the effect of their judgment to this case plus all future bond elec-
tions. Nonetheless, their second argument was more acceptable; that is,
since there was a misunderstanding as to the rules for approval, many voters
might not have voted at all because they might have believed the proposi-
tions could not possibly get the two-thirds majority required. Since the
ground rules of the election provided for a two-thirds approval, it would be
unfair to change them after-the-fact and declare the bonds approved. The
petitioners have another chance to put forth their proposals before the voters
with the new rules fully in force. Although Justice Mosk believed that the
prospective application was arbitrary and unfair to the petitioners,10 1 if the
bonds were certified as approved, then the other qualified voters who would
have voted "No" but chose not to vote at all because of their "security" in the
96 E.g., CAL. CONSr. art. XII, § 22 deals with the removal from office of Public
Utilities Commission members.
97 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968).
98 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.
99 CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 10(a).
100 2 Cal. 3d at 801, 471 P.2d at 513, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
101 Id. at 803, 471 P.2d at 514, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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two-thirds requirement would have no remedy whatsoever.
The decision in Westbrook v. Mihaly does expand the application of the
"gone man, one vote" principle, but it also clarifies the tests to be applied
when determining whether or not there are sufficient reasons for allowing the
departure from the strict majority rule. The function of this decision should
be to better protect the individual voter from encroachment of his vote by
any method. The burden has merely shifted to the state, when challenged on
a particular extraordinary majority provision, to justify and bear the burden
of proof of any deviations from the rule of equal voting power for individual
citizens.1
02
Michael V. Vollmer
102 Id. at 799, 471 P.2d at 511, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 863, where the court declared:
We see no a priori reason to assume that other extraordinary majority provisions
cannot be shown to be necessary to attain 'compelling' ends. Each must be judged
on its particular facts. Those which serve no such end will fall, but our decision
today commits us to no wholesale elimination of such laws.
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